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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The growth of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been one of the most significant 
developments in the U.S. workplace in the past twenty-five years. There is a significant and growing body 
of research tracking the development of ADR in U.S. employment relations, its effects on organizations 
and workers, and its implications for the community of neutrals and the providers of neutral services 
(Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003; Seeber and Lipsky 2006; Bingham and Chachere 1999; Bingham 2004; 
Colvin et al. 2006; Lewin 2004). The intense debates that have arisen over the desirability of ADR have 
caused both practitioners and researchers to recognize the need for the evaluation of all types of ADR 
programs, including those mandated by the courts, statutes, and other public policies and those 
established by private sector organizations (Seeber, Schmidle, and Smith 2001; Lipsky and Seeber 2006; 
Bingham 2004). 
The authors of this paper have conducted numerous evaluations of ADR programs in both the public and 
private sectors, and it has been our experience that the desire of the evaluators and the program 
sponsors to have an impartial and objective evaluation of a program has often been frustrated by political 
considerations. This paper will focus on the politics of the evaluation of ADR systems and programs. We 
maintain that there are three types of political factors affecting ADR programs: One type involves 
ideological and policy debates about the desirability of ADR; a second type involves political factors 
within an organization (whether private or public) that affect the adoption, implementation, and 
maintenance of an ADR program; and the third type is the political struggle that can sometimes emerge 
between the managers and practitioners who sponsor ADR programs and the academics and consultants 
who evaluate them. Here we concentrate particularly on the differences that arise between program 
sponsors and outside evaluators. Academic evaluators, for example, value the so-called purity of their 
research and strive to conduct evaluations consistent with accepted social science standards; program 
sponsors and administrators have evaluation objectives that are much more instrumental and pragmatic. 
All parties in an evaluation may very well have legitimate objectives, but political differences can arise out 
of the incompatibility of those objectives, an incompatibility that is often the consequence of the "clash of 
cultures" between academics and practitioners. 
In our view, political factors will invariably influence program evaluation. It is clear that some of the 
political differences that affect the evaluation of ADR programs (for example, ideological debates) are 
beyond the control of either the program sponsors and administrators or the evaluators. But there are 
other political factors that the parties can potentially manage, or at least influence. On the one hand, 
political differences can threaten the integrity of an evaluation. On the other hand, not all political factors 
have negative consequences for an evaluation. The trick for sponsors and evaluators alike is, first, to 
recognize the political factors they can control and, second, to distinguish between those that have 
positive effects on the evaluation and those that have negative effects. 
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Managing the Politics of Evaluation: Lessons 
from the Evaluation of 
ADR Programs 
David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber, Ariel C. Avgar, 
and Rocco M. Scanza 
Cornell University 
The growth of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been one of the most 
significant developments in the U.S. workplace in the past twenty-five years. There is 
a significant and growing body of research tracking the development of ADR in U.S. 
employment relations, its effects on organizations and workers, and its implications 
for the community of neutrals and the providers of neutral services (Lipsky, Seeber, 
and Fincher 2003; Seeber and Lipsky 2006; Bingham and Chachere 1999; Bingham 
2004; Colvin et al. 2006; Lewin 2004). The intense debates that have arisen over the 
desirability of ADR have caused both practitioners and researchers to recognize the 
need for the evaluation of all types of ADR programs, including those mandated by 
the courts, statutes, and other public policies and those established by private sector 
organizations (Seeber, Schmidle, and Smith 2001; Lipsky and Seeber 2006; Bingham 
2004). 
The authors of this paper have conducted numerous evaluations of ADR programs 
in both the public and private sectors, and it has been our experience that the desire of 
the evaluators and the program sponsors to have an impartial and objective evaluation 
of a program has often been frustrated by political considerations. This paper will 
focus on the politics of the evaluation of ADR systems and programs. We maintain 
that there are three types of political factors affecting ADR programs: One type 
involves ideological and policy debates about the desirability of ADR; a second type 
involves political factors within an organization (whether private or public) that affect 
the adoption, implementation, and maintenance of an ADR program; and the third 
type is the political struggle that can sometimes emerge between the managers and 
practitioners who sponsor ADR programs and the academics and consultants who 
evaluate them. Here we concentrate particularly on the differences that arise between 
program sponsors and outside evaluators. Academic evaluators, for example, value 
the so-called purity of their research and strive to conduct evaluations consistent with 
accepted social science standards; program sponsors and administrators have 
evaluation objectives that are much more instrumental and pragmatic. All parties in an 
evaluation may very well have legitimate objectives, but political differences can arise 
out of the incompatibility of those objectives, an incompatibility that is often the 
consequence of the "clash of cultures" between academics and practitioners. 
In our view, political factors will invariably influence program evaluation. It is 
clear that some of the political differences that affect the evaluation of ADR programs 
(for example, ideological debates) are beyond the control of either the program 
sponsors and administrators or the evaluators. But there are other political factors that 
the parties can potentially manage, or at least influence. On the one hand, political 
differences can threaten the integrity of an evaluation. On the other hand, not all 
political factors have negative consequences for an evaluation. The trick for sponsors 
and evaluators alike is, first, to recognize the political factors they can control and, 
second, to distinguish between those that have positive effects on the evaluation and 
those that have negative effects. 
Evaluation Research at the Institute on Conflict Resolution 
The authors of this paper are affiliated with the Institute on Conflict Resolution 
(ICR) at Cornell University. Since ICR's founding in 1996, we have not only 
conducted research on ADR programs and systems in numerous private and public 
sector organizations; we have also been called upon to assist in the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of ADR programs in some of those organizations. For 
example, we have evaluated ADR programs for the New York State Workers' 
Compensation Board, the Unified Court System of the State of New York, the U.S. 
Department of Labor, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and several private sector organizations 
(Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003; Seeber et al. 2001; Lipsky et al. 2003; Lipsky, 
Scanza, and Avgar 2006). We believe our experiences have provided us with insights 
about the politics of program evaluation, and in this paper we attempt to translate 
those insights into analytical and prescriptive terms. Admittedly, our paper is written 
from the standpoint of outside evaluators, but we think we have learned some lessons 
that are valuable not only for outside evaluators but also for program sponsors and 
administrators. In the more analytical portion of the paper we deal with both the 
substantive and process issues that invariably arise in every program evaluation and 
how political factors can affect those issues. In the prescriptive part of the paper we 
offer advice on how evaluators and sponsors can manage and derive benefits from the 
political factors that they are capable of influencing. We will use illustrations drawn 
from the evaluations we have conducted, in some cases naming the organization in 
question but in other cases purposely maintaining the anonymity of the organization. 
Pressures for Program Evaluation 
Research suggests that many organizations turned to ADR because they were 
certain it would save the time and money associated with litigation and maintain 
management's control over dispute resolution (Lipsky and Seeber 1998, Colvin 2003). 
We found that many major corporations adopted ADR policies after they had endured 
a crisis (a multimillion dollar lawsuit, for example) and a "champion" within the 
organization persuaded top management that ADR was preferable to alternative 
means of handling disputes (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). In the early days 
many of these organizations gave little thought to the systematic evaluation of the 
ADR processes they had adopted. Most of the organizations we have studied have 
been content to install tracking software that produces basic information about the 
operation of the ADR program but falls far short of providing the data needed for a 
comprehensive evaluation. Over time, however, managers in many corporations 
demanded more evidence that there was a good business case for using ADR; they 
increasingly wanted to know whether ADR programs produced an acceptable return 
on investment (ROI) and were cost effective. It was easy for a chief financial officer 
(CFO), for example, to observe that an ADR program added costs to the company's 
operations (usually in the form of additional staff), but it was difficult for the CFO to 
tell whether the ADR program produced tangible benefits. Top managers demanded 
accountability and consequently required that more careful evaluations be undertaken 
of their ADR programs. 
A parallel development occurred in public sector agencies. In New York State, for 
example, the executive and legislative branches of the state government had searched 
for many years for means of reforming the state's multibillion dollar workers' 
compensation system. A bipartisan consensus was reached that the use of ADR, along 
with other reforms, could potentially save the state's employers and taxpayers millions 
of dollars. But the reform bill's sponsors realized that the controversial reforms they 
favored would only gain broad acceptance if it could be proven to all stakeholders that 
they were actually effective. Consequently, the legislators inserted into the reform bill 
a provision calling for Cornell University to conduct a systematic evaluation of the 
ADR experiment (Seeber et al. 2001). 
Other lawmakers, at both the federal and state levels, have mandated that ADR 
programs be evaluated by impartial outsiders. The policy makers' growing insistence 
on evaluation is itself a response to the political pressures they face. By supporting the 
use of ADR, they risk alienating important constituencies that are often opposed to its 
use (for example, the union movement, the plaintiffs' bar, etc.). Inserting an evaluation 
requirement in a statute is a means of legitimizing the use of ADR and an attempt to 
remove it from the political fray. Legislators can claim, perhaps truthfully, that they 
seek transparency in the use of public funds and will support only those programs that 
are proven, by means of careful evaluation, to be truly effective. 
Criteria for an Ideal Evaluation: A Clash of Cultures 
The methodological standards and evidentiary criteria that are essential for a sound 
evaluation are well understood and accepted within the academy. In most of the 
organizations in which we have worked, however, we found that the managers and 
administrators of the programs we evaluated seldom had a firm grasp of these 
standards and criteria. Most social science researchers, beginning with their Ph.D. 
training, are immersed in the technical aspects of program evaluation, and program 
administrators cannot be faulted for pursuing a different career path. The sponsors and 
administrators of ADR programs have more pragmatic and instrumental objectives. 
They prefer evaluations that produce results that can be easily understood by all the 
stakeholder groups that need to be satisfied, and they seek recommendations that can 
be translated into practice. 
There are four principal differences that distinguish academic culture from 
practitioner culture. First, academic researchers are taught to appreciate the value of 
experimental design and whenever possible want to conduct evaluations that have 
both "treatment" groups and "control" groups. Although pure experiments are actually 
quite rare in the social sciences, researchers strive to design an evaluation that closely 
mirrors an authentic experiment. In the evaluations we have conducted, we have 
almost always made efforts to set up an appropriate control group so that we could 
more precisely determine the effects of the "treatment"—the ADR program—we were 
evaluating. Occasionally we have succeeded, but usually practical considerations 
limited the design of our evaluation. 
For example, in the evaluation we conducted of the New York State Workers' 
Compensation system, we were able to arrange for a reasonable control group (Seeber 
et al. 2001). But in our evaluation of a pilot ADR program conducted by the 
Solicitor's Office in the U.S. Department of Labor, we were never able to do so. In 
that project a mediation program was introduced in every one of the Solicitor's 
regional offices, and so there were no obvious regions or offices that could serve as a 
contemporaneous control group. We discovered in the course of doing our evaluation, 
however, that the use of mediation varied systematically across regions, and we were 
able to make use of that variation to explain the effectiveness of the pilot program. 
The variation was explained in part by the commitment of the regional solicitor to the 
program and in part by the nature of the cases handled in the region (Lipsky et al. 
2003). 
A second broad area of potential conflict between researcher and client is the 
extent to which there is a need for statistical rigor. Although the value of data and 
evidence is apparent to most policy makers, they rarely appreciate the need to collect 
the appropriate independent and intermediary variables necessary to create the 
statistical rigor demanded by evaluators. Thus, the evaluators' desire to collect 
appropriate data through surveys, questionnaires, and data from already existing 
organizational records is seldom greeted with enthusiasm by organizations. In every 
evaluation study in which we have been involved, we have driven the data collection 
process much further than the sponsors thought necessary or useful. 
Third, the integrity of an evaluation, in the view of academic researchers, depends 
on several factors relating to the evaluators' ability to maintain their independence and 
impartiality. For example, independence and impartiality depend in part on the 
evaluators' ability to produce a final report that is based entirely on the facts and 
evidence obtained. Academic researchers essentially strive to satisfy two audiences. 
One audience consists of the organizations that have sponsored and paid for the 
evaluation. The other audience consists of the researchers' colleagues and peers. To a 
degree, the objectives and interests of these two audiences do not correspond. 
Sponsors of an evaluation are seldom interested in the finer points of evaluation 
methodology, whereas academics'—their ability to get promoted and gain tenure— 
will depend on their ability to convince colleagues and peers that they have satisfied 
the highest standards of scholarly research. 
Finally, academics are committed to reporting all the relevant facts and evidence, 
good and bad, and they believe withholding any important findings potentially 
compromises the integrity of the evaluation. The academic culture frowns on 
hyperbole, while organizational clients, in our experience, nearly always wish to 
emphasize the best features of their program and to deemphasize the worst. We do not 
mean to say that they are dishonest or intend to cover up bad results. Rather, the 
differences are often the consequence of the differences in the time perspective of 
evaluators and clients. When academics submit a final report to the organization, they 
usually sever their relationship with the organization, whereas responsible 
organizational officials must live with the consequences of the evaluation. They need 
to worry about the effect of the evaluation not only on the future of the program that 
has been evaluated but also on other programs, people, and policies. 
The differences between evaluators and clients regarding an ideal evaluation 
represent largely a difference in cultures between the two groups. These cultural 
differences often result in the researcher questioning the sponsor's organizational 
commitment to a sound evaluation, while the sponsor views the evaluators as overly 
obsessed by data and analysis that they view as useless or irrelevant. In the end, these 
cultural differences nearly always require negotiation between the evaluators and the 
sponsors over precisely the level of organizational support for the evaluation. 
The Unavoidable and Inherent Influence of Politics in Evaluations 
There is little doubt about a fundamental source of political influence in program 
evaluations. Behind the introduction of an ADR program—whether it is a 
consequence of a change in public policy or is an innovation introduced by 
managers—is a group of individuals who believe that the program will have positive 
effects for the organization, for organizational outcomes the individuals value, or 
possibly for the individuals themselves. The individuals that trigger the innovation 
always have a stake in the success of the program they have sponsored. They are 
naturally concerned about the operation and effectiveness of the program and, 
therefore, the results of an evaluation. Here we need to distinguish between 
the politics of policy change and the politics of organizational change. The politics of 
policy change result from differing political and ideological views regarding 
competing public policies and their implementation. The politics of organizational 
change result from the differing views of organizational members and stakeholders 
over the merits of organizational innovations. The former pertains principally to 
politics outside the organization and the latter to politics inside the organization. For 
the evaluator both sources of political influence can threaten the integrity of an 
evaluation. But an evaluator is well advised to recognize the distinction between these 
two sources of political tension. There may be little or nothing evaluators can do 
about external political factors, but they may be able to limit and channel internal 
political factors. 
ADR programs almost always pit some organizational stakeholders against others, 
and this can result in frequently intense turf wars. For example, in one organization 
we studied, the "champion" of the ADR program was an attorney in the counsel's 
office. After persuading his superiors to adopt the program, he became its director. In 
that role he clashed repeatedly with managers in the human resource function who 
thought he was usurping their prerogatives. By almost any measure, the ADR program 
was a success, but eventually the director of the program was forced to leave the 
organization. In our research we also discovered that middle managers occasionally 
resist the introduction of ADR programs favored by top managers because they fear 
that such programs will undermine their authority (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). 
Employees and their unions (if they are represented) are often skeptical about the 
value of ADR programs and do not share management's interest in the effectiveness of 
such programs. In a corporation stockholders and other external stakeholders can have 
a very different focus from internal stakeholders. In a public agency ADR programs 
may pit the interests of legislators against the interests of agency managers (Lipsky, 
Seeber, and Fincher 2003). 
Moreover, ADR programs operate in environments rife with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. All of the programs we have evaluated were begun under conditions in 
which not all the critical procedural and policy questions about the implementation of 
the program had been answered. For example, we have entered organizations in which 
the program sponsors and administrators could not clearly specify the objectives they 
hoped the program would achieve. In more than one organization, we suspect, the 
objectives remained ambiguous because the internal stakeholders themselves could 
not agree on them and purposely kept them vague. In some organizations the 
establishment of the program itself represents "success" for the principal stakeholders, 
and whether the program actually achieves anything of value is of secondary 
importance. Thus, evaluators inevitably operate in a politically charged environment 
requiring negotiation over the terms and conditions of their engagement. 
This is not to say that the political nature of ADR program evaluation is all bad. 
There is a spectrum of political intensity that ranges, on the one end, from politics that 
is normal, expected, and even possibly constructive to, on the other end, politics that 
is unhealthy, destructive, and jeopardizes the integrity of an evaluation. The 
containment of unhealthy political factors is critical to the success of the evaluation, 
and it is a central task of both sponsors and evaluators to minimize these potentially 
destructive political influences. Ultimately, the evaluators at least must seek to gain 
the stakeholders' respect and their commitment to the evaluation process. 
Negotiating the "Bread-and-Butter" Issues in Evaluation 
In every evaluation the critical issues for negotiation can be reduced to four 
factors: the scope and clarity of the evaluators' mandate, the standards and criteria 
used for the evaluation, the minimization of conflicts of interest, and the establishment 
of buffers between the evaluators and the sponsors of the evaluation. 
The mandate for the evaluations we have conducted varied from project to project. 
For example, the mandate for our evaluation of the New York State Workers' 
Compensation ADR program was contained in the statute creating the program 
(Seeber et al. 2001). The mandate for our evaluation of the ADR program 
administered by the Solicitor's Office of the U.S. Department of Labor was the 
consequence of an interagency agreement (Lipsky et al. 2003). The mandate for our 
evaluation of the EEOC's internal dispute resolution program resulted from the desire 
of the program's principal administrators to find out whether the program was (by 
their definition) an effective one (Lipsky et al. 2006). In the case of the workers' 
compensation program, the statutory mandate gave us a tool we could use to control 
the agency's desire to alter the scope of our evaluation. By contrast, in the case of the 
Solicitor's ADR program, the multiparty interagency agreement had not sufficiently 
clarified our mandate and was subject to continuing renegotiation and interpretation. 
In the case of the EEOC's program, our mandate was specified in a contract between 
the agency and Cornell. However, disagreements arose during the course of the 
project regarding the interpretation of some of the key provisions in the contract. It 
may be an obvious truism to say that it is extraordinarily helpful to specify as 
precisely as possible the scope of the evaluators' mandate before the evaluation 
actually begins. But experience demonstrates (both in program evaluation and, we 
might add, in labor relations) that even the most careful attempts to negotiate the 
mandate in advance of the evaluation will not necessarily prevent disagreements from 
arising later. 
A second topic often requiring negotiation between the sponsors and the evaluators 
centers on the appropriate standards and criteria the researchers will use to evaluate 
the ADR program. For example, in one of our evaluations the sponsors were quite 
content to limit the evaluation to rudimentary measures of participant satisfaction with 
the program, whereas we maintained that the measures they preferred would not be 
sufficient to allow them to understand critical dimensions of their program's 
operation. The sponsors also did not want us to collect basic demographic data about 
the users of the program. We pointed out that program satisfaction was likely to vary 
significantly by the gender, age, and race of the users, but nevertheless the sponsors 
insisted on a narrow definition of the criteria used for the evaluation. We negotiated 
these issues at some length, but in the end we had to yield to the sponsors' wishes. We 
did our best to produce the type of evaluation the sponsors wanted, but clearly the 
standards and criteria we used fell far short of meeting the textbook definition of a 
valid evaluation. The important point is not that the evaluation failed to meet our 
standards; rather, the important point is that in our judgment the evaluation failed to 
serve the sponsors' purposes. 
A third topic necessitating negotiation between the sponsors and the evaluators 
centers on the need to minimize conflicts of interests that might undermine the 
integrity of the evaluation. Of course, even the appearance of a conflict of interest can 
undermine the evaluation. For many evaluations the sponsor or a funding agency 
issues a "request for proposals" (RFP), and the uninitiated may assume that each 
bidder has a fair chance of winning the competition based on the merit of the bidder's 
proposal. It is no secret, however, that many evaluation grants and contracts are 
"wired." That is, the RFP has been tailored to give an advantage in the competition to 
a preferred bidder, virtually guaranteeing the bidder will obtain the grant or contract. 
An alternative approach is for the sponsors to arrange for the evaluation to be done on 
the basis of so-called sole-source funding. We acknowledge that we have occasionally 
benefited from such arrangements. In some situations the pool of qualified evaluators 
may be very small, therefore justifying the targeted nature of the bidding process. 
Some sponsors may prefer to turn to a particular institution for an evaluation because 
the institution's reputation for quality work is well known and the sponsors want to 
take advantage of the institution's "brand name." Whether these considerations justify 
wired RFPs and sole-source funding is of course problematic. To say the least, 
maintaining the independence and impartiality of the evaluation can be challenging if 
the evaluators have too cozy a relationship with the sponsors. Sponsors who channel 
grants and contracts to favored evaluators may have an expectation of reciprocity, 
usually in the form of the evaluators' "seal of approval." 
We always do our utmost to protect our own integrity, and we assume the vast 
majority of evaluators do the same. The importance of protecting one's integrity is not 
only a matter of ethical principle; it is also a pragmatic consideration as well. In the 
long run we realize we will lose our reputations if we compromise the integrity of our 
work. We also know we will be judged by our colleagues and peers in the research 
community, and our careers will be damaged if they come to believe that we have 
crossed the boundary of accepted practice. The best response to these issues is, again, 
to negotiate them up front, preferably before the grant or contract is awarded. The 
preferred approach, we believe, is for evaluators to make it clear to the sponsors that 
they intend to conduct an independent and impartial evaluation, and to disabuse them 
of any notion they may have of receiving special favors because no other evaluators 
were considered for the project. 
This discussion illustrates a common problem in program evaluation, namely, the 
lack of "buffers" between the evaluators and the sponsors. Some might argue that, in a 
perfect world, a firewall should separate the evaluators from the sponsors. But the 
evaluation of ADR programs requires communication between the evaluators and the 
sponsors on a continuing basis. In many ways, the best evaluation is a collaborative 
effort, characterized by ongoing interactions among the evaluators, sponsors, program 
administrators, and other stakeholders. All those interactions, however, offer 
opportunities for the stakeholders to put pressure on the evaluators in order to slant 
their work to suit the stakeholders' interests. The dilemma is to protect the evaluators 
from these political pressures while at the same time allowing them to have adequate 
communication with the sponsors and other stakeholders. 
The solution is to create devices that serve as buffers. A contract is one device 
that can serve as a buffer, provided the contract adequately defines the parties' 
expectations and the limits on what is and is not permissible in the evaluation. We 
believe the parties should give consideration to specifying in the contract the means 
they will use to resolve disputes over the interpretation of the contract—a device that 
has the added benefit of mimicking a common feature of an ADR program. (We 
acknowledge that the contract office at Cornell would not approve a contract 
provision that delegated disputes over contract interpretation to third parties.) 
Another buffer is to involve third parties in various phases of the evaluation 
process. For example, the sponsors and evaluators may agree to have an advisory 
board or council oversee the evaluation. Such entities were established for some of the 
projects we conducted, including our evaluation of the workers' compensation ADR 
program and our evaluation of the Solicitor's program in the Department of Labor. In 
the former case the advisory board did an admirable job of serving both the sponsors' 
interests and our own; in the latter case the advisory body became the arena for 
intense debates and squabbling. Nevertheless, it was preferable to have these conflicts 
surface in the advisory body rather than in our direct relationship with the Department 
of Labor. 
For some of our projects surveys and interviews were conducted "in house" by 
faculty and staff associated with the Institute on Conflict Resolution. For other 
projects the scale of the evaluation necessitated the use of Cornell's Survey Research 
Institute (SRI). A by-product of subcontracting survey work to SRI was that SRI 
served as an effective buffer between the sponsors, its members, and us. In effect, we 
could rely on SRI's expertise, and not just our own, to deflect pressures emanating 
from the sponsor during the course of the evaluation. 
Throughout our discussion we have referred to the so-called sponsors of the 
evaluation. However, it is often not a straightforward matter to identify the sponsor. 
For example, the nominal sponsor of our evaluation of the EEOC program (and the 
signatory to the contract) was the agency itself. However, we needed to deal 
principally with two individuals who were the de facto sponsors: one was the director 
of the ADR program and the other was the special assistant to the chair of the 
commission. We admire greatly both individuals, but in time we discovered that they 
did not necessarily share the same goals and interests. The director of the ADR 
program understandably focused on what she perceived to be the best interests of her 
program, whereas the special assistant to the chair, for equally understandable 
reasons, focused on what she considered to be the best interests of her boss and of the 
agency itself. Arguably, our two principal contacts at the EEOC were not the only 
"sponsors" of our evaluation; the entire commission and the senior staff of the agency 
were also sponsors, although we had little or no contact with them. In the evaluations 
we have conducted the sponsors were almost always a group of individuals who had a 
vital stake in the success or failure of the program we were evaluating. 
Ultimately, it is up to the evaluators to resist political pressures that threaten to 
compromise the integrity of their evaluation. The more experiences we have 
accumulated, the more we have realized the importance of negotiating the issues that 
are the potential source of disputes at the beginning of the evaluation process. 
Resolving key "bread-and-butter" issues before the evaluation begins can be the key 
to the success of the evaluation. Although up-front negotiation is essential, we 
believe, disagreements are bound to arise in the course of the evaluation. When these 
disagreements threaten to compromise the evaluation, it is critical for the evaluators to 
hold their ground and rely on their own professional standards as well as the 
agreements they reached with the sponsors at the start of the project. 
The Cassandra Effect: Delivering Bad News 
The last step in an evaluation is the preparation and delivery of the final report. 
Some final reports are "dead on arrival"—filed away by the sponsor and never seen 
again. For some organizations the utility of the evaluation is not related to the 
evaluators' substantive findings and recommendations but rather to the fact that an 
evaluation was conducted in the first place. Most of the evaluation projects we have 
conducted, however, have had substantive and not merely symbolic significance. In 
the best of all possible worlds, the substantive findings allow the evaluators to write a 
final report that satisfies the needs and objectives of the program's sponsors and 
stakeholders. In our experience, however, the findings rarely result in a final report 
that contains only good news for the sponsors. Even the most favorable evaluations 
we have conducted identified some program weaknesses that needed to be addressed. 
For example, our evaluation of the Department of Labor program demonstrated 
that the program was clearly achieving its objectives; the benefits of using mediation 
in enforcement cases, for example, clearly exceeded the costs, and virtually all users 
of the program were highly satisfied with both the mediation process and its 
outcomes. However, in our final report we offered some constructive 
recommendations for improving the administration of the program (Lipsky et al. 
2003). Although our recommendations were received in the spirit in which they were 
intended, we nevertheless experienced some degree of discomfort in delivering them 
to the people responsible for administering the program. In other evaluations we had 
bad news to report to the sponsors. Evaluators need to recognize that bad news can 
often create serious political problems for the sponsor. The survival of the program 
may be at stake, and the careers of the individuals who administer those programs can 
be seriously affected. 
In one evaluation we discovered that many complainants using the ADR program 
feared retaliation; we were surprised to learn that many of the managers and 
supervisors who usually were the respondents in these complaints also feared 
retaliation—that is, they were afraid that they would be penalized for having 
complaints filed against them. We knew these findings would be regarded as truly bad 
news by the evaluation's sponsors. The problem was not inherent in the ADR program 
itself, nor was it the fault of the program's administrators. Rather, the source of the 
problem seemed to be in the culture of the organization. Yet reporting our findings 
could jeopardize the future of the ADR program, and we truly believed that the best 
interests of the organization and its employees would be served if the ADR program 
survived. We pondered at length how to report our findings to the sponsors. Could we 
possibly sugar-coat the truth and maintain our integrity? Were we prepared to take 
responsibility for damaging the careers of the program's sponsors, especially when we 
did not believe the sponsors were responsible for the problems we discovered? Before 
we submitted our final report, we had private sessions with the sponsors and gave 
them an honest account of our findings. The findings naturally disturbed the sponsors, 
and they did identify some of the limitations in our analysis. We agreed to modify our 
final report in ways that we believed did not compromise its fundamental integrity. 
Achieving acceptability of our findings in this and other projects was not a matter of 
covering up or varnishing the truth but rather was a matter of properly "framing" the 
results (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Subsequently, the organization undertook 
training programs that helped to improve supervisory practices and did, to some 
degree, address the problems we identified in our evaluation. 
Cassandra was executed for telling the truth. In the evaluations we have conducted, 
we have always been conscious of the possibility that we could pay a price for telling 
the truth. If delivering bad news results in the demise of a program, it is not only the 
sponsors and administrators who may suffer as a result: the evaluators' reputations and 
prospects for future work may also be affected. The likelihood of evaluators receiving 
grants and contracts for future work can be diminished if potential sponsors learn that 
the evaluators had conducted projects that damaged the interests of previous sponsors. 
But covering up the truth can be equally detrimental to the evaluators. Evaluators who 
discover that a program has serious weaknesses but nevertheless declare the program 
to be a success need to anticipate that eventually "the truth will come out." The short-
term gain of satisfying the sponsors' needs and desires will be far outweighed by the 
longer-term harm to the evaluators' credibility in both the scholarly and the 
practitioner communities. On both ethical and practical grounds, honesty is the best 
policy. 
Conclusion: Managing Expectations 
In this paper we have identified some of the political issues that can affect the 
evaluation of ADR programs, and we have suggested some of the means sponsors and 
evaluators can use to deal with those issues. We believe political pressures can be 
minimized but never fully eliminated. Both sponsors and evaluators should recognize 
that evaluations involve multiple stakeholders, and those stakeholders are likely to 
have different objectives, values, and needs that make the evaluation process an 
inherently political one. Evaluators should certainly strive to conduct their work in a 
fashion that conforms to the standards of social science research, but maintaining the 
"purity" of their evaluations is likely to be more the ideal than the reality. Evaluators 
and sponsors almost invariably are required to negotiate issues that are critical to the 
design and execution of the evaluation. Negotiations almost always result in 
compromises, but in evaluation work as in other walks of life, compromise should not 
mean the sacrifice of important principles. 
It is better for evaluators and sponsors to launch an evaluation fully aware of the 
potential political pitfalls they are likely to encounter than to proceed naively and face 
unanticipated problems in the midst of the project. Our experience has taught us that 
dealing effectively with political issues is largely an exercise in managing 
expectations. Sponsors and evaluators should understand that it is in their mutual 
interests to deal with issues that may cause political problems up front. A joint 
problem-solving approach at the start of the project can help avoid an adversarial 
relationship later in the project. 
We hold the conviction that most organizations that have sponsored evaluations are 
better off for having done so. In the organizations in which we have worked, attempts 
to minimize the importance of the political aspects of the evaluation allowed us to 
produce better studies than we might have otherwise. Resolving political issues up 
front helps, but both evaluators and sponsors need to understand that they are still 
likely to face political issues that arise in the course of the evaluation process that they 
could not possibly anticipate at the start. Approaching a project in a collaborative, 
problem-solving fashion, however, makes it easier to deal with political issues that 
may arise later. 
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